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The Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP countries is part of a general evaluation of EU aid requested by the 
Development  Council  in  June  1995.  The  second  phase  of  the  study  focuses  on:  (i) policy 
formulation;  (ii) policy  dialogue  between  the  EC  and  the  individual  ACP  states;  and  (iii) aid 
implementation and management. 
The field  stage  looks  at  policy  dialogue  and  aid  implementation  in  six  countries and  one  region 
concentrating on  selected aspects of EC  assistance in  each  country/region.  The present report  is 
concerned with the  regional programme in  the Caribbean.  The other six reports cover Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroun, Liberia and Jamaica. 
The  field  study  of  the  Caribbean  regional  programme  is  particularly  focused  on  the  Eastern 
Caribbean countries which are members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).  Its 
sectors  of  concentration  are:  (i) the  international  trade  relations  with  respect  to  bananas;  and 
(ii) regional trade and integration.  The study focuses  both  on  issues of policy dialogue and of the 
implementation  of EC  assistance  provided  under  the  Caribbean  Regional  Indicative  Programme 
(CRIP). 
The study  report  is  based  on  the  findings  from  a  short visit  to  Barbados  undertaken  from  17-27 
February 1998
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•  The field work was organised around: 
•  the review of project files; 
•  interviews with EC Delegation staff; 
•  interviews with representations of the EU Member States, other donors; and 
•  interviews with regional programme and project staff. 
The draft report was presented in May 1998 to the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development) of the European Union and the Commission. 
The evaluation team is  grateful for the  support of the EC Delegation, and for the collaboration of 
Government officials and the representatives of other donors (particularly Member States). 
C.  Montes 
ACP Evaluation Field Phase Coordinator 
Those  wishing to obtain copies of the synthesis report or the other case studies should contact the 
Head of  the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex of  the European Commission. 
See Annex A for the list of people interviewed. Executive Summary 
EXECUTIVES~RY 
This field study is concerned with the regional 
assistance programme to the ACP countries in 
the  Caribbean  Region.  It  is  particularly 
focused  on  the  small  island  states  of  the 
Eastern  Caribbean  and  considers  the  policy 
dialogue  on  bananas  (OECS),  and  the  wider 
policy  dialogue  on  promoting  regional 
integration and trade (CARIFORUM, CEDA). 
The study  also  looks  at  CARIFORUM's role 
as  the  regional  association  of ACP countries 
which  is  responsible for  the  management EC 
regional aid. 
The principal findings of the study are that the 
EC has played an active role in addressing the 
problems of adjustment in  the banana industry 
in the Eastern Caribbean.  In the wider area of 
promoting  regional  trade  and  economic 
integration, its assistance appears to have been 
insufficiently focused.  The implementation of 
the  EC  regional  assistance  programmes  has 
faced  problems  of  implementation  delays 
arising from the application of EC systems and 
procedures that  are  common  to  ACP country 
programmes. 
Regional Context 
There are  15  ACP countries in the Caribbean, 
all but three of which are island states.  Haiti 
and  the  Dominican  Republic  are  the  most 
recent  countries  to  join  the  regional  ACP 
group and acceded to the Lome Convention in 
1991. 
The countries show wide disparities in  levels 
of economic  development.  They  have  small 
open  economies  with  imports  of goods  and 
non-factor  services  averaging  about  80%  of 
GDP.  Apart  from  Jamaica,  Guyana  and  the 
Dominican  Republic,  the  countries  have  not 
faced  severe  external  debt  crises.  Fiscal 
policies  have  generally  been  conservative. 
Around 24% of the workforce is  employed in 
the public sector.  Declining aid flows and the 
erosion of preferential trade arrangements are 
placing  pressure  on  the  ACP  countries  to 
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diversify  and  make  their  economies  more 
competitive. 
There  are  a  number  of  regional  economic 
associations and considerable overlap between 
them.  The  Association  of  Caribbean  States 
(ACS)  is  the largest and  most recent of these 
groupings.  CARICOM  comprises  the  ACP 
countries  less  Suriname,  Haiti  and  the 
Dominican Republic  and has  as  its  main aim 
the  creation  of  a  single  market  among  its 
members.  The  Organisation  of  Eastern 
Caribbean  States  (OECS)  is  a  grouping  of 
seven  of  the  smallest  island  states  in  the 
Windward Islands.  CARIFORUM includes all 
ACP countries and exists as  the inter-face on 
regional cooperation and trade issues with the 
EC.  The Caribbean Group for Cooperation in 
Economic  Development  is  the  main  forum 
between  the  Caribbean  countries  and  the 
International Financial Institutions. 
EC Aid to the Caribbean Region 
EC  regional  aid  is  provided  as  project 
assistance  through  the  Caribbean  Regional 
Indicative  Programme  (CRIP).  Additional 
regional  funds  are  available from  EC  budget 
lines and from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB): 
•  Allocations  for  the  CRIP  under  EDF 7 
totalled  105 Mecu,  of  which  15  Mecu 
represented  an  additional  allocation 
following  the  accession  of Haiti  and  the 
Dominican  Republic  to  Lome. 
Implementation of the programme has been 
-delayed  and  Financing  Agreements  for  a 
number  of  major  projects  were  not 
concluded until 1995.  By the end of 1996, 
97% of the original EDF 7 CRIP allocation 
had  been  committed,  of  which  8%  had 
been disbursed.  An allocation of 90 Mecu 
has been allocated to  the CRIP for EDF8. 
The  main  focal  areas  for  EDF 8  are: 
(i) regional  integration  and  cooperation; 
and  (ii) human resources development and 
regional capacity building. •  Between 1991  and  1995 financing from EC 
budget lines totalled 9.3 Mecu of which 7.9 
Mecu was allocated to the banana industry. 
•  Em  regional  lending  has  been  mainly  to 
support  operations  of  the  Caribbean 
Development  Bank.  The  EC  has  also 
provided risk capital (managed by the Em) 
to  support  the  development  of small  and 
medium enterprises. 
OECS national aid allocations under Lome IV 
(including Em) totalled 238  Mecu at  the end 
of  1996.  Of  this  amount,  129  Mecu 
represented Stabex allocations to  St.  Vincent, 
St. Lucia, Grenada and Dominica.  The EC  is 
the largest donor in  the OECS  accounting for 
some 25% of all aid flows.  Coordination with 
donors  tends  to  be  through  informal 
mechanisms.  There is  a regular exchange of 
infonnation  between  the  Delegation,  UK 
representations, and the French representation 
in St. Lucia. 
Regional Policy Dialogue 
Indicative programming for EDF 8 began with 
the  preparation  by  the  Delegation  of  the 
Strategy Paper.  This elaborated a strategy of 
"open  regionalism"  in  which  regional 
integration  within  the  Caribbean  leads  to 
greater  integration  with  the  world  economy. 
Within this framework, EC  assistance is  seen 
as  facilitating:  (i) strengthening  Caribbean 
participation  in  regional  economic  bodies; 
(ii) the  refonn  of  public  sector  institutions; 
(iii) trade development and  the elimination of 
trade  barriers;  and  (iv) the  harmonisation  of 
commercial regulatory  frameworks  and  fiscal 
regulations.  Because it  involves  15  countries, 
policy dialogue in  the preparation of the CRIP 
is  necessarily  relatively  limited  and  involves 
few  policy  reform  commitments  and 
conditionalities.  There  is  considerable 
coherence  in  the  choice  of sectors  supported 
between  the  CRIP  and  National  Indicative 
Programmes (NIPs). 
On  bananas,  the  EC  has  conducted  a  very 
active  policy  dialogue  with  the  producer 
countries  of  the  OECS  with  the  aim  of 
facilitating  the  restructuring  of the  industry. 
This dialogue  was  initiated by  a donor group 
led  by  the  EC  which  was  established  in 
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response  to  falling  prices  and  production 
levels and the  threat of further loss of market 
share  following  a  1997  WTO ruling and  the 
expected phasing out of banana quotas.  It led 
to the development of an action plan aimed at: 
(i) increasing  the  efficiency  and 
competitiveness of Windward Islands bananas 
production;  (ii) commercialising  the 
operations  of  the  Banana  Growers' 
Associations  (BGAs);  (iii) reforming  price 
mechanisms  in  order to encourage producers 
either to  leave  the  industry  or increase  their 
efficiency; and (iv) simplifying and promoting 
greater  competition  within  the  distribution 
chain. 
The  action  plan  was  adopted at a  meeting at 
Prime  Ministerial  level  in  Kingstown/St. 
Vincent  in  1995,  and  was  subject  to  two 
subsequent agreements  concluded in  Castries 
in  November  1996 and January  1998.  These 
provide  for  the  use  of  Stabex  fmancing 
totalling  103  Mecu  to  support  the 
implementation of the  restructuring plan  and 
also make available budgetary support to meet 
the  additional  fiscal  demands  caused  by 
restructuring.  The  EC  has  coordinated  the 
donor  group  very  effectively  and  this  has 
facilitated  coordination  and  complementarity 
between the support being provided by the EC 
and other donors involved in the restructuring 
programme.  The  proposed  use  of  Stabex 
fmancing  is  innovative  and  required  intense 
negotiation with the OECS governments. 
On  regional  trade  and  economic  integration, 
the  objective  of  EC  support  has  been  to 
facilitate regional integration by changing the 
relatively inward orientation of regional trade. 
This  is  to  be  achieved  through  reducing 
barriers  to  external  trade  and  encouraging 
countries. to join broader regional agreements. 
The  strategy  involves:  (i) the  use  of 
CARIFORUM  to  support  the  negotiation  of 
future  global  trade  agreements  for  the 
Caribbean ACP countries; (ii) the fmancing of 
a trade development programme implemented 
by the Caribbean Export Development Agency 
(CEDA);  and  (iii) the  prOVISIOn  of 
infrastructure fmancing.  Our fmdings suggest 
that  there  may  be  an  insufficient  strategic 
focus to the programme. The  Caribbean  Export  Development  Agency 
(CEDA) which is supported through the CRIP 
has had some success in providing support to 
exporters  in  developing  export  markets. 
However, there is some concern that it may be 
targeting  some  products  which  are  primarily 
traded  in  regional  markets  and  which,  while 
enjoy  high  levels  of  protection,  are  not 
internationally  competitive.  According  to  a 
recent  draft  evaluation,  the  effectiveness  of 
some  components  of  CEDA  (institutional 
support and human  capital  development)  has 
been  limited.  Better  coordination  with  the 
private sector was recommended. 
CEDA has had an impact,  though limited,  in 
influencing trade  policy.  Through studies,  it 
has  contributed  to  discussions  on  deepening 
CARICOM  mechanisms  and  on  new  trade 
arrangements. 
Regional  Aid  Implementation  and 
Management 
Effective  policy  dialogue  and  efficient 
programme implementation requires strong aid 
management  procedures.  The  role  and 
resources of the EC Delegations, the  strength 
of the collaborating regional organisations, the 
arrangements  for  project  identification  and 
preparation,  and  the  effectiveness  of 
implementation procedures for EC projects all 
influence the effectiveness of aid management. 
Through  its  eight  Delegations  and  two  EC 
Offices,  the  EC  has  the  largest 
representational  structure  among  donor 
agencies  operating  in  the  Caribbean.  The 
Guyana Delegation  has  overall  responsibility 
for  liaison  with  Headquarters  and 
CARIFORUM on regional cooperation issues. 
The Delegation in Barbados is responsible for 
the aid programmes to the OECS countries, for 
regional programmes in seven sectors, and for 
the  policy  dialogue  on  bananas.  Highly 
centralised  decision-making  procedures, 
limited fmancial delegation and extensive EC 
fmancial  controls  result  in  a  heavy 
administrative  workload  on  the  Delegations 
and  considerably  reduce  the  professional 
resources  available  for  dealing  with 
substantive policy  issues  and aid programme 
management.  The  situa~ion  is  made  more 
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difficult by  delays  in  appointing replacement 
staff.  Delegations  rely  on  Headquarters 
mainly for administrative support in pursuing 
decisions in Brussels and only to very limited 
extent in providing expert policy advice. 
CARJFORUM  is  mandated  by  the  ACP 
governments  in  the  Caribbean  to  handle  the 
management of regional aid programmes.  Its 
formal ministerial meetings are held annually. 
A  small  Programming  Unit  (PU)  in  the 
CARIFORUM  Secretariat  is  responsible  for 
preparing the CRIP and subsequently for the 
identification and preparation of projects.  In 
these  tasks  it  relies  heavily  on  the  use  of 
consultants.  Project  management  is 
undertaken  by  governments  or implementing 
agencies usually under the overall supervision 
of  a  Deputy  Regional  Authorising  Officer 
(DRAO) nominated for the project.  A recent 
innovation  is  the  creation  of  Programme 
Management  and  Coordination  Management 
Units (PMCUs) to  support implementation of 
the  major  regional  programmes  involving  a 
number  of  implementing  agencies.  While 
CARIFORUM appears to have been effective 
in increasing commitment rates under EDF 7, 
there is some evidence that this may have been 
at the expense of the adequate involvement of 
those organisations responsible for subsequent 
implementation.  This  could  had  have  an 
adverse  impact  on  the  subsequent 
implementation stage. 
Project  selection  is  reported  to  be  heavily 
influenced by the desire of the CARIFORUM 
member  countries  to  see  the  sharing  or 
regional  funds  between  countries.  National 
considerations  can also  result  in  programme 
activities becoming overly dispersed among a 
large  number of countries.  More generally, 
the  procedures  for  project  identification, 
preparation and fmancing involve delays. 
Programme  implementation  delays  are 
attributable  to:  (i) the  complex  institutional 
and operational structures relating to regional 
programmes;  (ii) overly  complex  programme 
and  project  design;  (iii) limited  resources  in 
the  PU  and  Delegations  to  monitor 
implementation; (iv) insufficient ownership of 
programme  at  the  level  of  national 
governments;  and  (v) lengthy  and bureaucratic  procurement  procedures  which 
have  particularly  affected  the  recruitment  of 
PMCUs.  In the case of the tourism and human 
resources  development  programmes, 
recruitment of the  PMCU staff took over 30 
months  and considerably delayed  the  start-up 
of  programme  activities.  EC  payment 
conditions and delays also make it difficult for 
local consultants to tender for T A contracts. 
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However,  in  the  implementation  of  project 
activities, extensive use has been made of the 
work programme procedure in order to  allow 
for  the  necessary  flexibility  in  management. 
Project  monitoring  is  weak.  A  regular 
programme of evaluations  is  in  place  and  in 
some cases has resulted in significant changes 
in the operation of regional programmes. Chapter I  Regional Context 
CHAPTER I.  REGIONAL CONTEXT 
A.  The Caribbean Region 
The Caribbean Basin comprises 37 countries in Central and Latin America and in the Caribbean Sea. 
Among the  Caribbean island states there  are  francophone,  anglophone and hispanophone states as 
well as five British Dependent Territories, three French Overseas Departments, two Dutch Dependent 
Territories and two US  Associate Territories.  Within the Region there are 15 ACP countries
2
, which 
except for  Belize, Guyana and Suriname are  island states. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) has a membership of seven small independent states in the Windward and Leeward 
Islands. 
B.  The Regional Economy 
External Balances 
The Caribbean ACP countries show wide disparities in  levels of economic development. They have 
small open economies, with imports of goods and non-factor services averaging about 80% of GOP. 
This  makes  them  particularly  vulnerable  to  external  shocks  including  bad  weather  and  adverse 
fluctuations in terms of trade.  Because currencies are mostly pegged to the US dollar, the economies 
are  also  vulnerable  to  fluctuations  between  the  US  dollar  and  major  European  currencies.  The 
Region benefits from trade preferences under both EU and USA trade regimes.  However, following 
the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), these preferential 
arrangements are now threatened. 
With the exception of Jamaica, Guyana and the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean economies did 
not experience severe external debt crises and relatively generous aid flows have limited the need for 
balance of payments  support.  However,  in  more  recent years  aid  has  declined and the  favourable 
trade  arrangements  are  being  eroded.  The consequent  need  for  adjustment  is  putting  increasing 
pressure on Caribbean countries to diversify and make their economies more competitive, and to open 
state controlled  industries  to  the  private  sector.  This  is  reinforced  by  pressures  from  lower cost 
American  producers.  The  banana  industry  in  the  OECS  states  provides  a  good  example  of the 
urgency of such restructuring (see Chapter IV). 
Fiscal and Social Policy 
The public sector has had an  important role in most of the Caribbean ACP economies. Government 
expenditures were around 35% of GDP in the late 1980s and have changed little since then.  Most of 
the ACP countries, including those in  the Eastern Caribbean, have followed relatively conservative 
fiscal  policies.  Public expenditure has  been directed to  infrastructure (often in support of tourism 
development), education and health services.  Survey evidence
3 suggests that public expenditure on 
Antigua  &  Barbuda,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Dominica.  Dominican  Republic,  Grenada.  Guyana.  Haiti, 
Jamaica. St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago. 
For example,  Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development in the Caribbean, \''/orld Bank, May 1996; 
Poverty Assessment Reports (St Lucia,  St Vincent & Dominica), Caribbean Development Bank, 1996. 
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basic  services  has  been  generally  progressive,  but  less  so  for  secondary  and  tertiary  services.
4 
Education and health services are free, and literacy rates are high. 
Expenditures  on  safety  net  programmes  average  over  1.5%  of GDP  across  the  ACP countries, 
targeting children, low income families with children, the elderly, the unemployed and the disabled. 
National insurance schemes are being developed in  many countries. The population structure of the 
region  is  characterised by  high  dependency ratios,  and  this  puts a  strain on  the  social safety net 
budgets. Drug abuse is a growing problem in most of the countries, as is abuse of women. 
Over 24% of all  workers are employed in  the public sector and the share of wages in total public 
expenditures  is  correspondingly  high.  The  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  overall  employment  is 
particularly strong. In principle, regional co-operation provides the opportunity to reduce some of the 
costs of the public sector. 
C.  Regional Economic Bodies
5 
The region has numerous economic associations. The Association of Caribbean States (ACS), which 
includes most of the Region's countries, is  the most recent of the regional groups.  The Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) is the oldest group, having been established in  1973 with the long-term aim 
of establishing a single market among its member countries.  The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) has a membership of seven small independent states in  the Windward and Leeward 
Islands
6
• The headquarters of ACS  is  in  Trinidad, of CARICOM in Guyana and of the OECS in St 
Lucia. 
Two  regional  bodies  have  been  established  to  facilitate  relations  with  international  bodies.  The 
Caribbean  Forum (CARlFORUM)  was  created in  1991,  when  Haiti and  the Dominican Republic 
joined the ACP states. It is  based in Guyana and facilitates coordination between the regional ACP 
members  and  the  EC  on regional  aid  and  trade  issues.  Similarly,  the  Caribbean Group  for  Co-
operation in  Economic Development (CGCED)  is  an  important forum for  discussions between the 
Caribbean countries and the International Financial Institutions, as well as other donors. 
4  Although more than in other poor countries. 
For recent background information on regional economic bodies in the Caribbean region, see H. Gill, F. Pellerano 
and  R.  I  {es,:,,  A  New  Strategy  to  Promote  Regional Integration  in  the  Caribbean  Region,  Evaluation  Unit  of 
DGVIII, March 1996. 
Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are Associate Members. 
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CHAPTER II.  EC AID TO THE CARIBBEAN REGION 
A.  Size and Composition of European Community Aid 
EC  aid  to  the  Caribbean  Region,  as  opposed  to  its  individual  countries,  is  provided  as  project 
assistance through the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CRIP).  In addition to aid provided 
though the CRIP, regional funds are also made available from EC budget lines and from the European 
Investment Bank (Effi).  A number of the Eastern Caribbean states have received substantial Stabex 
assistance  which,  although  provided  at  country  level,  has  in  recent  years  had  a  strong  regional 
dimension linked to the international trade discussion on bananas (see Chapter IV). 
CRIP Allocations Under EDF 7 and EDF 8 
A  total  of 90  Mecu  was  allocated  to  the  CRIP  under  both  EDF 7  and  EDF 8.  In  1995  EDF 7 
allocations were increased by  an  additional  15  Mecu for programmes in  Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic following the  accession of these countries to  the Lome Convention 
7
•  Table 1 shows the 
main  focal  areas  for  assistance  under  the  CRIP  (excluding  the  Haiti  and  Dominican  Republic 
allocations for EDF 7). 
Table 1:  CRIP Allocations for EDF 7 and EDF 8 
Sectors Prioritised  CRIP EDF7  CRIP EDF 8 
Mecu  %of total  Mecu  %of total 
1.  Regionallntegration and  49.5  55%  40.5 Mecu  45% 
Co-operation 
(i) trade and tourism; (ii} agric- (i) trade, tourism, private sector 
ulture; (iii) transport and comm- development; (ii) rural develop-
unications  ment; (iii) infrastructure 
2.  Sustainable Development/  36.0  ·40%  37.8  42% 
Human Development and 
Capacity building 
(i)  human resource develop- (i) human resource develop-
ment; (ii) environment  ment; (ii) regional capacity 
building 
3.  Action outside focal  4.5  5%  11.7  13% 
objectives 
(i)  non-tied T  A and ad-hoc  (i) decentralised co-operation; 
studies; (ii) cultural co- (ii) programming, monitoring, 
operation  evaluations (incl programme 
unit for CARIFORUM) 
Total  90.0.(1)  100%  90 Mecu  100% 
Source:  Regional Indicative Programme for the Caribbean region, Fourth Lome Convention, First and 
Second Financial Protocol. 
Note:  (i) In 1995 an additional contribution of 15 Mecu was allocated to the Caribbean ACP countries to 
complement the funds allocated for the CRIP under EDF 7. 
Under EDF 8 the continuation of this funding will be incorporated into national aid allocations. 
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Implementation of  the CRIP under EDF 7 
Implementation of the trade and tourism programmes under EDF 7 have progressed well (Table 2). 
By the end of 1996, more than half of trade commitments had been translated into contracts (a third 
in the case of tourism), while the overall average is  25%.  However, disbursements were only 8% of 
commitments.  The low level of disbursement is due to  financing agreements for a number of major 
projects not being signed until after mid 1995. 
Table 2:  EDF 7 Implementation • Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme 
(end 1996) 
Total  Primary  Secondary Commitment  Disbursement 
Allocation  Commit- %of Prim- %of Prim-
ment'  Mecu  ary Comm- Mecu  ary Comm-
Mecu  itment  itment 
95.0  87.5  22.2  25.4%  7.0  8.0% 
Source:  Regional Cooperation in the Caribbean, Annual Report 1996, prepared by the EC 
Delegation, Guyana 
'  Excludes additional 15 Mecu allocated in 1995 following accession of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic to Lome. 
Budget Lines 
The Caribbean region also benefits directly from EC budget lines: 
•  Between  1986  and  1990  budget  line  allocations  totalled  0.5  Mecu  divided  between: 
(i) evaluations (0.3 Mecu);and (ii) NGO co-financing (0.2 Mecu). 
•  Between  1991-1995  budget  line  allocations  totalled  9.3  Mecu  divided  between: 
(i) evaluations  (0.1  Mecu);  (ii) NGO  co-financing  (0.9  Mecu);  (iii) environment  (0.3 
Mecu); (iv) the  banana industry (7.9 Mecu); and (v) support for women in development 
(0.1  Mecu) 
EIB assistance 
A loan of 20 Mecu provided from the Em's own resources was agreed on in October 1996 to be paid 
as a global loan to the Caribbean Development Bank. The EC also provided risk capital (managed by 
the Em) to  support the small and medium sized enterprise sector through the Caribbean Financial 
Services Corporation
8 and the transport sector (4 Mecu). 
EC Assistance to Countries at a National Level 
Regional allocations under the Lome Convention are additional to a country's national programmes. 
Each of the fifteen countries benefiting from the regional programme has its own National Indicative 
Programme (NIP) and  may also benefit from programme aid provisions.  In  the case of the  OECS 
region,  four  countries  (St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent,  Grenade  and  Dominica)  receive substantial Stabex 
funds  as  a result of declining international banana prices.  Under Lome IV these have totalled  130 
Mecu, or more than half of total aid to the Eastern Caribbean states (Table 3).  These countries have 
also  benefited from  Em's interest  rate  subsidies  or risk capital.  Grenada and Dominica received 
structural adjustment support. 
2 Mecu under Lome III and 4 Mecu under Lome IV. 
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Table3:  Eastern Caribbean Countries - Lome IV Allocations (December 1996) 
Mecu 
Structural.  Risk Capit-
NIP  STABEX/  Adjustment  aVIRS**  EIB Loan  Total 
St Vincent  5.4  45.1  5.0  55.5 
St Lucia  5.0  44.5  3.8  10.0  63.3 
St Kitts  2.5  2.0  4.5 
Grenada  6.5  12.3  2.0  2.4  4.0  27.3 
Dominica  5.5  27.7  2.2  2.5  37.9 
Antigua & Barbuda  3.5  3.5 
Barbados  5.5  30.0  35.5 
Anguilla  2.9  2.9 
British Virgin Islands  2.4  1.5  3.9 
Montserat  3.9  3.9 
Total  43.1  129.6  4.2  13.7  47.5  238.2 
* = includes special assistance for banana producing countries 
•• = risk capital, special loans or interest rate subsidies paid for from the EDF but manaqed bv the EIB 
B.  Institutional Arrangements for EC Aid 
Coordination with other donors in the OECS region 
The European Community is the largest donor to the OECS region. The UK also has a substantial aid 
programme and representation in the region.  France is represented through its Caisse Francaise de 
Developpement. The USA and Canada were formerly significant donors but have scaled down their 
contributions in the recent years.  Many UN agencies are present in the region.
9  In some countries in 
the region,  the BWI has  an  active lending programme, and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) are also important donors. 
UNDP is  responsible for coordination among UN agencies and other donors and used to prepare a 
report on aid donors and lenders to the region. 
10  This report shows that in  1995 the EC represented 
25% of all  aid to the region,  while the UK accounted for 20%. US  and Canada still accounted for 
about 40% of the total aid.  The IADB was the major source of loan fmancing, although in individual 
countries borrowing from the CDB, Em and Caisse Francaise was also significant. 
Coordination 
There has been a relatively low level of donor coordination at regional level.  UNDP used to organise 
donor meetings but they were not well attended.  UNDP also believes that the countries in the region 
prefer to  be  in  charge of coordination themselves.  Donor coordination in emergency and disaster 
preparedness during the hurricane season continues to be very effective. 
Regional coordination among EU donors is not formal. In the most recent programming exercise, the 
Delegation  organised  a  consultation  with  EU  member states  on  the Strategy Paper and  the  NIP. 
Moreover, there is a coordination mechanism for the discussions on banana issues and on the social 
sectors in  the  Windward islands (Stabex-related).  Within the OECS area, the Delegation, the UK 
representations,  and  the  French  representation  in  St.  Lucia  exchange  information  on  the 
10 
Including UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, UNIFEM and the UN organisation for Drugs Control. 
UNDP, Tables on External assistance by donor- Eastern Caribbean region, Development Co-operation 1993- 4 
Report.  Since then no comparative data exist.  According to a UNDP representative, producing such a report had 
become less of a priority after 1995  when the United States and Canada reduced their programmes substantially 
and the EU remained as the main donor before the UK. 
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developments  in  the  different countries  as  well  as  on  their aid  interventions.  This  is  particularly 
important because the UK has the second largest aid programme in the region.  Some of the EC and 
UK programmes are complementary (e.g. banana restructuring in the Windward Islands, education in 
the OECS and water supply in Grenada). 
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CHAPTER Ill.  REGIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE 
A.  Introduction 
The Caribbean region poses special challenges to the EC in engaging in policy dialogue due both to 
the large number of states involved and their strong sense of political autonomy. 
This  chapter  considers  the  EC'  s  policy  dialogue  in  three  main  areas:  (i) the  preparation  and 
negotiation of the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme (CR.IP)  for EDF 8;  (ii) the response to 
developments  in  the banana industry  in  the OECS;  and (iii) the  issues of intra-regional trade and 
regional integration handled through CARIFORUM. 
B.  Preparation of the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme 
The Caribbean Strategy Paper 
The programming process for EDF 8 began with the preparation of a Regional Strategy Paper (Box 
1). Compared to the previous programming exercise, more preparatory work was done in the region. 
The Strategy Paper was prepared by the Delegation in Guyana with inputs from several units from 
Headquarters.  The paper was  also  discussed by  the  heads  of Delegations in the  region  and with 
representatives of the Member States.  In Headquarters the paper was scrutinised by the Comite de 
Suivi before being presented to  the EDF Committee in September 1996.  Following its approval in 
September  1996  the  Strategy  Paper was  used  as  the  EC' s  mandate  for  negotiating the  CRIP for 
EDF8. 
Preparation of  the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programmes 
While preparation of the Regional Strategy Paper primarily involves the EC and the Members States, 
~he ACP countries were fully involved in the preparation and negotiation of the CR.IP for EDF 8.  The 
Programming Unit in  CARIFORUM was  responsible for preparing the  draft  CRIP,  following the 
framework provided by the Regional Strategy Paper, but with the Caribbean states deciding on the 
overall  objectives  and  focus  of the  programme.  It  was  then  negotiated  between  the  EC  and 
CARIFORUM and the size of the aid programme and sector priorities formally agreed.  The CR.IP 
was eventually signed on 19 February 199i 
1
• 
The CRIP is  more narrowly focused and detailed than the NIPs.  Because it involves 15 countries it 
necessarily involves fewer policy and reform commitments and conditionalities.  However, there is 
considerable coherence in the choice of sectors supported between the CRIP and NIPs. 
II  The  previous  regional  indicative  programme  was  signed  in  July  1992  and  was  mostly  produced  under  the 
leadership  of CARICOM.  It  undertook  the  s~tor analysis  and  presented  the  programme  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers. CARl  COM also amended the regional programme and negotiated it with the EC. 
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Box 1: The Caribbean Regional Strategy Paper for EDF 8 
.ir{ftie contexf  of the preparation of EOF 8, the purp()Se of the Canbbean Regional Strategy Paper was to 
inform decision makers of the factors influencing the choice of aid programmes. The medium term effects of 
restructuring measures are explicitly considered as well as their poverty impact This provides the basis for 
the identification of a strategy consistent with overall growth and poverty goals.  The Strategy paper also 
includes an overview of regional organisations and initiatives and of donor aid inflows and suggests greater 
involvement of the private sector and civil society through CARl  FORUM and the Programming Unit. 
The paper  ·identifies the regional integration strategy as one of  "'open regionalisnf. It sees  regional economic 
integration as a necessary condition for the integration of the Caribbean countries in the world economy. It 
considers possibilities tor EU interventions: 
0  to improve  the conditions for Caribbean participation in regional economic bodies (such as the ACS); 
· 0  to support public sector instiMions 
·¢ ·to support trade development aimed at elimination of barriers to trade and investment; 
0  to support policy, legal, and regulatory reform and harmonisation in the fields of trade, standardisation,  .. 
· · investment and company and fiscal regulations.  ·  · ·  .  ..  ·  ..  · 
Twa.  foeal sectors are identified for EDF 8: region~  economic integration and human development and.  ~  .. 
·capacity building. The paper proposes capacity building support to regional organisations in the future 
~here  they prove to be effective and  politically  feasible-~ It also supports capacity building in environment, 
population policies, disaster preparedness, science and technology, and drugs.  While the Strategy Paper 
appears to be of high quality, in some areas there is lack of technicaJ analysis to justify the proposed 
strategies (e.g. in the discussion of intra-regional trade and tother interventions• ). 
In the discussion of the Strategy Paper with the Caribbean representations of the Member States, some 
representatives argued that the paper did not make clear which programmes were to be financed. The British 
noted that the proposed scope of the policy dialogue was too wide ranging. Other Member States mentioned 
the difficulties of regional interventions covering 15 countries and their  preference for sub-regional initiatives. 
Some were critical of the additional bureaucracy involved in CARlFORUM. 
When the Strategy Paper was discussed by the EOF committee some of these comments were repeated.  As 
a result, the EC strengthened the sub-regional focus of the Strategy Paper and decided to keep the 
negotiating mandate general. given the limited success that had been achieved in the implementation of the 
EDF7 CRIP. 
C.  Policy Dialogue in International Trade Relating to Bananas 
Context 
Bananas have enonnous social and economic significance for many countries in the region. Indeed, 
much of the argument used in  favour of the continuation of preferential trade agreements relates to 
the social problems which will occur as these agreements are terminated.
12 The history of the banana 
culture  in  the  Caribbean  is  long  and  linked  with  the  struggles  of freed  slaves  to  establish  their 
economic independence and of the  poor to survive natural disasters.  It has also had an important 
socio-political role  in  maintaining democratic  and  collectivist traditions.  Consequently,  there  are 
many non-economic factors that inform the banana policy dialogue. 
The banana trade arrangement, which guaranteed access and high prices to ACP bananas in Europe 
acted as  an  incentive against improving quality and efficiency. Moreover, the way in  which banana 
production and export are organised in the Windward Island is a major cause of inefficiency (Box 2). 
The  institutional  arrangements  are  such  that  growers  get  a  price  that  does  not  fully  reflect  the 
variation in prices in  Europe, nor quality differences. In this context, growers only bear a moderate 
risk and have very little incentive to diversify and improve quality. 
12  e.g. Jc:;eph M B, Post Lome IV Arrangements Must Mirror the Principles and Instruments of  Lome: A Perspective 
from the Banana Sectors of  the Windward Islands, ECDPM Working Paper Nr 18, Maastricht. 1997. 
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Despite these preferential trading arrangements, Windward Island earnings from their banana exports 
to Europe have declined steadily from EC$ 376 million in  1992 to  EC$ 224 million in  1996. This 
trend is mainly due to a drop in the volume of exports and, to a lesser extent, to a decline in prices. 
Over this period the Windward Islands lost a third of their market share and average quota utilisation 
rates were down to 65% (from 80%). 
Box 2:  Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean Banana Trade. 
The way in which-the banana industry in the Eastern Caribbean is organised has contributed to the conditions 
which have led to declining production during the 1990s and to the difficulties which will be faced in adjusting 
to greater international competition.  · 
In each of the Eastern Caribbean countries there is a Banana Growers' Association (BGA), which is a 
parastatal, and which buys bananas from the growers at a price which only marginally reflects market prices. 
Differences in prices do not fully capture differences in quality. This implies that high quality producers 
subsidise low quality producers. It provides little incentive to growers to improve product quality. Low quaflty 
was a major element explaining the loss of export revenues in the 1990s. 
The risk of growing bananas is borne by the BGAs. The distribution of Caribbean bananas into Europe is an 
oligopoly, supported by the licensing system. Distributors, which  transport and ripen bananas, give to the 
BGAs a price which takes into account the market price of bananas, less freight and ripening costs and  their 
margins. As a result. the risk of price fluctuations is not spread along the production and marketing chain, but 
it is bome entirely by the BGAs. The BGAs' debt by the end of 1994 was EC$ 130 million against total export 
earnings In the same year of EC$ 216 million.
13 
The heavy load of this trade rests on the shoulders of the Windward Islands. The BGAs bear  the risk, 
whereas the growers get a relatively guaranteed price, but which is normally Jess than 20% of the retail price 
in Europe. A recent study of the EU policy for the Banana Markee" shows that if the retail price of bananas in 
the UK is 48 pence, the producer country would get 15~  1 pence, the import and wholesaler 8.9 pence and the 
retailers 19.1 pence (data for 1989). This system although ineffiCient worked while the banana trading 
arrangements generated sufficient rents to ensure adequate returns to each party. 
The decline in export earnings is explained by  a set of factors pertaining both to the organisation of 
production in the islands and market conditions in Europe. Environmental misfortunes, production 
costs,  uncertainty  over marketing arrangements,  periodic  shortage of inputs  and falling  prices  all 
contributed to curtail the supply of bananas. Moreover, quality became a major problem. In  1995, the 
region lost EC$ 50 million (18% of export earnings) because of quality claims. On the demand side, 
Central American producers are becoming more competitive and have drastically increased market 
share. 
WTO rulings against the 1992 EU banana regime, can be expected to make conditions for Caribbean 
growers more difficult.  If national quotas are abolished, the Windward Islands can be expected to 
lose further market share to more efficient ACP producers. 
The Policy Dialogue with the EC 
In  1994,  in  the  context  of the  deterioration  of banana export  conditions,  the  OECS  Secretariat 
requested assistance from a number of different donors.  In response a donor group was formed in 
March  1994  and  including  the  EC,  the  British  Development Division  in  the  Caribbean  (BDDC), 
UNDP and the CDB.  The donor group decided that it was not appropriate to provide aid funds in the 
form of price support as changes in trade policy and in the market for bananas in Europe meant that a 
more fundamental restructuring of the banana industry was required. 
13 
14 
Cargill Technical Services Ltd, Action Plan for the Restructuring of  the Windward Islands Banana Industry, 1995 
Stevens C. in Wallace H and W Wallace (eds.), Policy Making in  the European Union, Oxford University Press, 
1996 
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The  donor  group,  in  agreement  with  the  OECS,  therefore  commissioned  a  preliminary  study  to 
analyse the major deficiencies of the industry and identify key restructuring measures
15
•  This led to 
the adoption of an action plan by the donors and the OECS governments at meeting in Kingstown in 
September 1995.  This provided for the development of a core banana industry capable of competing 
in liberalised markets by the year 2002 (Box 3). 
Box 3:  Restructuring of  the Banana Industry 
'  '' 
The restructuring of the Windward Islands banana industry will require:  . 
. 0  increasing the effiCiency of Windward Islands growers by directly targeting and supporting their efforts 
to improve farming practices; 
o·  commercialising part of the activities of the Banana Growers' Associations (BGAs); 
0  refonniog the price mechanism so as to give producers the right incentives to either leave the industry 
· or increase their efficiency; 
, ¢- simplifying and dismantling the distribution chain, so a8 to transfer back Part of the marketing rent to · 
· distributors.  ·  ,. · .  -;-- ·"""'"" · · 
The overall strategy. that was agreed at Kingstown and further developed at two subsequent meetings in 
Castries, takes into account the importance of the banana industry in the economic and social life of the 
countries involved and incorporates social actions to ease the transition.  It is estimated that restructuring 
could require a reduction of two thirds in the number of growers. If this reduction is implemented, and 
production is concentrated in the most fertile land, the Windward Islands can produce a competitive product 
for the European market.  Support should therefore only be granted to 'those fanners who are considered to 
be able to survive in a fully competitive environment' (Castries II Agreement). 
A much stronger drive towards efficiency and restructuring will come from changes rn the price system.  The 
aim is 'to ensure that lndMduaJ growers receive the msrket returns for the quality of  their product so that 
producers of  good quality fruit do not subsidise the low quality producers' (Castries II Agreement).  However, 
the system of governance of BGAs could present major barriers to changing the price mechanism.  Since the 
board of directors of each BGA are elected by the growers on a one-man one-vote basis1 it faces difficulties in 
taking unpopular decisions. Moreover the BGAs are effectively parastataf organisations as their debts are 
covered by government guarantees.  The boards are therefore not accountable for their debts reducing the 
pressure to take difficult decisions.  Another necessary step to transform banana production into a market 
driven activity would be to privatise some of the activities of BGAs. 
The simplification of the bananas' distribution. and marketing system should haWen  .. a$ a consequence· of the. 
dismantling.of the licensing system in Europe, following the WTO ruling. ·However, there are two major :. :  '·. · 
obstacles to the liberalisation of distribution and marketing, which are independent of the licensing system;·. ·  ·  ·  _· 
First, growers are compelled by law to sell their products to the BGAs. Second BGA&r together with their  :  · · 
governments own the Windward Islands Banana Development Company (WIBDECO) which has a joint. ·  ..  , 
venture with a European partner owning Geest bananas, ·a European banana importer. ·  Geest and its.:·,  --::_:  .; __ 
European joint owner now have an effective monopoly on the Import of Windward Islands bananas into  ·., · 
Europe.  This has resulted in some conflict of interest within the BGAs and it is questionable whether they· ·  ·· 
would favour greater liberalisation of the distribution system which might allow growers to deal directly with  .· 
non-monopolistic buyers. 
Restructuring of the banana industry will involve considerable social costs during the tra.1sitional period.  The 
dependence of many poor families on small-scale banana growing has been described in many poverty  . 
studies. However, the existing structure of the industry cannot be said to be 'pro-poor' and there coufd welf be 
long-term benefits to poorer famiJies from restructuring the industry although this will depend to a great extent 
on the success of government policies in generating alternative employment opportunities.  . ·  ·  ·  ,  . ,  .  . 
The action plan agreed at Kingstown also provided that future support for the banana industry should 
be based on  commercial rather than  political  criteri~ allowing prices to  growers to  reflect quality 
differences,  so  as  to  encourage  the  emergence  of a core  group  of efficient banana growers.  The 
national  Banana  Growers'  Associations  (BGAs)  were  to  incorporate  the  good  governance  and 
management provisions proposed in the consultant's study.  It was also agreed that considerable TA 
support was needed to help bring about the reforms. Finally, other measures were agreed to support 
15  The consultancy study was undertaken by Cargill Technical Services. 
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diversification  from  banana  production  into  other  agricultural  activities  or  even  outside  the 
agricultural sector all together.
16 
This strategy was  confrrmed and refmed in  subsequent meetings between the donor group and the 
Prime Ministers of St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica, incorporated into the Castries I Agreement 
(November 1996) and the Castries ll Agreement (January 1998). The plan was to be supported by a 
considerable increase in aid funds utilising the Stabex 1994-95 transfers (to be disbursed in  1997 and 
1998).  These totalled  103  Mecu,  compared with  22 Mecu  under the  previous  1992-1993  Stabex 
transfers. 
The Castries  Agreements  represented  a  concerted  attempt  to  address  the  problems  of the  banana 
industry (Box 4). They were the outcome of a  successful policy dialogue between the EC and other 
donors. The EC supported this policy dialogue through the use of the Stabex instrument shifting its 
use from general price support to  the financing of a specific restructuring programme. The different 
banana agreements  since  1995,  from  Kingstown  to  Castries  IT,  reflect the  defmition of a  strategy 
broadly shared by most key actors. 
Box 4: The Castries Agreements and the Use of Stabex Funding 
Linking the use of Stabex funds to the implementation of the Castries Agreements represents an example of 
adapting a potentially unsuitable aid instrument to support the implementation of refonn and restructuring  ·  --·  · 
poDcies... The restructuring of the banana industry required urgent action supported by quick-disbursing funds 
and a programme rather than project approach.  The proposed use of Stabex funds as budget support 
specifically recognises this requirement treating it as a social, economic and pubHc finance problem as 
·opposed to a specific issue relating to banana receipts •.  ,· ·  ·  .:  "· .{·  .. .... "''. ··.,  .  : ·  ·  ..  ·  ·  <~,  • 
,~~·  ...  '-:.~·.,  '~.-·~  -·_, __  , 
However, the Onking of Stabex to the Castries II agreement remainS a sensitive issue since Stabex is an · 
automatic mechanisms of support to which the EC is bound by the lome Agreement  The EC therefore has 
only limited scope in placing policy conditionalities on the use of the funds, necessitating a careful and 
genuine policy dialogue that was not without difficulty.  In the case of St Lucia there were robust discussions 
and a commitment to address the fundamental problems. In Dominica, the government initially tried to 
negotiate subsidies rather than plan for restructuring.  The EC's response was to coordinate most donors. 
including the BWI. into a common stance over the Castries strategies which were later accepted by 
Dominica. 
Finally, although the objective of restructuring the banana industry was shared by all participants, the 
modalities of implementing some of the more difficult elements of the strategy have yet to be agreed.  Thus, 
while targeting support on efficient producers is explicitly detailed in the Castries Agreements. there is no 
specific mention of the timetable for reforms to the BGAs. 
A number of general policy conclusions can be drawn from the reform of the banana industry in the 
Eastern Caribbean: 
16 
17 
•  Preferential  treatments  granted  to  the  ACP  countries  have  been  an  indirect  way  for 
providing aid. Market prices of ACP commodities_ were kept high by  quotas. At the same 
time, Stabex provided funds to compensate ACP countries for adverse price fluctuations. 
1'1any  of the  features  of this  system are  incompatible with  WTO rules.  Furthermore, 
there is some evidence that this system was inefficient and inequitable.  It was inefficient 
because the amount of resources transferred to ACP countries is small compared to the 
distortion  induced  by  higher  prices  paid  by  European  consumers.
17  It was  inequitable, 
See Stabex 1995 Framework of Mutual Obligations between the Government of St. Lucia and the EC. 
The preferential treannent of banana costs to EU consumers at roughly five dollars for every dollar transferred to 
preferred suppliers Barrel B, Bananarama III, World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers nr 1386, 1994 
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because a  large  part  of the  quota  rent  goes  to  oligopolistic  importers  and wholesalers 
protected by the quota system. 
18 
•  The dismantling of preferences  will  need  to  be  accompanied  by  a  requirement for  aid 
resources  to  support  restructuring  of  the  industry,  so  as  to  facilitate  long-run 
competitiveness and  meet the costs  of promoting alternative employment opportunities. 
In such cases, aid should be conditional on trade reform.  However, it is important to find 
an adequate and realistic conditionality approach. In the Caribbean, this was based on the 
governments'  commitment  and  capacity  and  the  extensive  EC  involvement  in  policy 
dialogue  and  the  innovative  use  of Stabex  funds.  In  addition,  the  restructuring of the 
banana  industry  should  be  accompanied  by  support  for  diversification,  particularly  in 
agriculture, and social safety nets. 
•  Sectoral  restructuring  also  benefits  from  general  budget  support  which  can  respond 
quickly to crisis situations.  This is potentially to be provided by the Stabex facility. 
D.  Policy Dialogue in Regional Trade and Integration
19 
This  section  considers  the  policy  dialogue  on  intra-regional  trade  and  regional  integration  and 
cooperation and contrasts it with the international trade dialogue on bananas.  The role of the EC in 
this area can be seen in  terms of:  (i) its objectives as  set out in the Regional Strategy Paper; (ii) the 
institutional  arrangement  for  pursuing  regional  integration  policies;  and  (iii) the  design  and 
implementation of the trade component of the regional programme. 
Objectives 
The Strategy Paper for EDF 8 argues that a major constraint on economic development for most of 
the Caribbean states  is  their smallness  in  terms  of population  and  national  domestic  product and 
hence the importance of promoting greater regional economic integration.  The paper also notes that 
the generally similar comparative advantage of the small island economies limits the scope and pace 
of economic cooperation and integration.  Consequently, regional integration is seen as  a necessary 
condition to better integration into the world economy and therefore "support to the integration will 
be at the heart of  the regional programme".  This is to be achieved by enhancing the competitiveness 
of local producers while alleviating the negative social impacts of moving to free trade. 
Achievement of these broad goals implies that a central implicit objective of the regional programme 
should  be  to  change  the  relatively  inward  orientation  of the  CARICOM  agreement  by  reducing 
barriers to external trade and by encouraging member countries to join broader regional agreements. 
The key issue is  the extent to  which the EC  assistance is  likely to  contribu~e t'J  the achievement of 
these objectives. 
Institutional Arrangements 
At the policy level, dialogue between the EC and the ACP countries on issues of regional trade and 
integration  is  conducted  through  the  mechanism of CARIFORUM.  CARIFORUM  is  an  ad hoc 
institution  which was  set up  primarily so  that a regional  programme could be negotiated with  an 
18 
19 
A recent study shows that if the retail price of bananas in the UK is 48 pence, the producer country would get 15.1 
pence, the import and wholesaler 8.9  pence and the retails  19.1  pence (data for  1989).  See Stevens, in Wallace 
and Wallace (eds.) Policy Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 1996, and Borre! B,  1994, op 
cit. 
Annex B contains a discussion note on some of the issues relating to trade integration. 
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institution that represents all the Caribbean ACP countries.  Its role in facilitating the negotiation of 
global trade agreements is unclear. 
20 
There are clear advantages to  having CARIFORUM as a body through which to negotiate the EC'  s 
regional assistance programme. However, some concern was expressed that member countries did not 
perceive CARIFORUM as an institution that represents them and consequently that their ownership 
of the regional aid programme might be limited
21
• 
Design and Implementation of  the Trade Sector Component 
The trade sector component of the CRIP is  implemented through the Caribbean Export Development 
Agency (CEDA).  Under EDF 7 the EC is providing an allocation of 14 Mecu to CEDA with a further 
2.4 Mecu coming from  the  governments and  the private sector of CEDA member countries.  The 
overall objectives of CEDA are: 
•  to strengthen the economies of CARIFORUM countries; 
•  the promotion of regional cooperation and integration; and 
•  the promotion of exports outside the region. 
CEDA was established in  January  1996 and  replaced the  CARl  COM Export Development project 
which had  been  in  operation  since  1988.  It  is  involved  in:  (i) trade  information  and promotion; 
(ii) technical  assistance;  (iii) export  training;  (iv) trade  policy  advocacy;·  and  (v) institutional 
development. It provides services to the private sector on a cost-sharing basis.  It also works with the 
private sector and  with governments  in  the  area of trade reform,  and in  supporting representative 
organisations such as the chambers of commerce. 
A mid-term evaluation of CEDA was being carried-out at the time of the country visit. Its preliminary 
conclusions  were  that  CEDA  has  been  reasonably  successful  in  supporting fmns  in  their export 
activities with more than 200 firms utilising its services.  However, some of the components of the 
CEDA  programme,  particularly  institutional  support  and  human  capital  development,  were 
considered  to  have  been  less  effective  and  requiring  either  redesign  or  cancellation.  More 
importantly, the evaluation identified the need for a greater focus to CEDA's mandate with it either 
developing as  a development/policy support agency or as  a business support agency.  In  the  latter 
case a greater share of financing should be  provided from the private sector.  The evaluation also 
noted the need to  increase cost recovery for the services provided by  CEDA and only to  subsidise 
costs of advice to private sector clients in exceptional cases.
22 
A  further  issue  not  being  considered  by  the  CEDA  evaluation  is  the  extent  to  which  CEDA 
concentrates  its  activities  on  promoting products  which  are  viable  in  international  markets.  The 
available data suggests that in many cases CEDA targets products whtch are primarily traded within 
regional markets and which enjoy high levels of protection.  There is thus a risk that, in promoting 
regional  integration,  CEDA  could  end  up  supporting  protectionism  instead  of  focusing  on 
development of the  region's  ability to expand trade in  international markets  .. 
23  This highlights the 
importance  of  links  between  the  activities  of CEDA  and  the  wider  policy  dialogue  on  trade 
20 
21 
22 
23 
CARIFORUM was initially intended to facilitate the negotiation of global trade agreements for all Caribbean ACP 
countries,  but  this  role  has  not  developed  as  yet.  This  is  in  part  because of the  overlap  with  the  existing 
CARICOM grouping,  and  because of the moves towards concluding much larger trade area agreements for the 
Caribbean basin. 
These are issues for which time constraints prevented further investigation particularly in discussing the role and 
operation of CARIFORUM with the its members and with the EC Delegation in Guyana. 
Steps to increase cost recovery have recently been taken. 
However,  staff in  the  Commission  argue  that  the  intervention  is  designed  to  make  the selected  sectors  more 
competitive. 
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liberalisation
24
•  However,  through  a  series  of studies  CEDA  has  contributed  to  discussions  on 
deepening CARICOM mechanisms  and  on  new  trade  arrangements  (Dominican Republic,  Central 
America).  The development of trade relationships with Cuba has also been supported by CEDA. 
In some respects the EC' s dialogue on regional trade contrasts with that on the banana trade. In  the 
case of bananas, there has been intensive dialogue, strong negotiations, and high quality policy and 
implementation studies. While the contrast is partly explained by the commitment of governments in 
the region, in our view policy dialogue on regional trade has not been as strong as it might have been. 
The creation of the CEDA was not sufficiently linked to a wider regional strategy, and there has been 
limited monitoring of its impact on economic integration and trade policy. 
Although in  1992 CARICOM defined a plan to reduce external barriers, but until now very few actions have been 
taken. 
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CHAPTER IV.  REGIONAL AID IMPLEMENTATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 
A.  Introduction 
Effective policy dialogue and  efficient programme implementation requires strong aid management 
procedures.  This  chapter  considers  how  the  EC  manages  its  regional  aid  programme  in  the 
Caribbean.  Specifically it addresses:  (i) the role of the EC  Delegations and their relationship with 
Headquarters; (ii) the operation of the  institutional framework of regional organisations with which 
the EC cooperates; (iii) the procedures for project identification, planning and appraisal; and (iv) the 
implementation procedures for projects financed under the CRIP. 
B.  Role of the EC Delegations 
The EC has the largest representation in  the Caribbean ACP countries through its eight Delegations 
and two EC offices (staffed by a resident counsellor). The Delegation in Guyana, perfonns most of 
the tasks relating to  contacts  with  Headquarters and CARIFORUM on regional cooperation issues 
and the CRIP.  It has a regional adviser to assist the Delegation with the additional policy dialogue 
and  management  of  funds  under  the  CRIP.  Some  of these  functions  are  shared  with  other 
Delegations  responsible  for  the  management of a  particular regional  programme or project or in 
dealing with aspects relating to a particular country. 
Although the level of NIP financing at  country level  is  relatively small,  regional programmes and 
Stabex  increase  significantly  the  workload  of the  Delegations.  This  applies  particularly  to  the 
Delegation to  Barbados and the OECS  countries  which  administers aid programmes to  and liaises 
with seven ACP countries, three overseas territories and three DOMs, deals with significant Stabex 
funds  to support the banana industry and general economic diversification, and has responsibilities 
for several regional programmes. 
25 
In the past, Delegations dealt exclusively with co-operation issues, but since Maastricht have become 
increasingly involved in a wider ambassadorial role that covers all spheres of EC competence.  In the 
Caribbean, this has resulted in Delegations spending considerable time in non-aid issues, such as anti 
drug-trafficking policies, and  in  increasing the visibility of EC activities through increased contact 
with the media. 
Administrative Demands on the Delegations 
The  extensive  representation  of the  EC  in  the  Caribbean  should  in  theory  facilitate  the  policy 
dialogue  with  governments  and the  management  of aid programmes.  However,  in  practice this  is 
made  difficult  by  the  highly  centralised  decision-making  structure  and  insufficient  fmancial 
delegation
26
•  Moreover, its financial controls are extensive and extremely time consuming. Several 
25 
26 
Education, trade, tourism, environment, broadcasting, culture, and postal matters. 
Some 70% of aid management decisions are taken at the uppermost level of the hierarchy (Commissioner, Director 
General and Deputy Director General) while the rest are taken by Heads of Delegation (source:  Acting Director 
General, 1997: Reforming the procedures for financing decisions under the g;.obal commitment authorisations and 
for managing TA). 
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evaluations have commented on the resulting heavy administrative workloads on Delegation advisers 
that substantially detract from their professional roles. 
This  administrative burden can be  even more damaging for  a  regional programme which  must of 
necessity  include  complex  management  structures  and  institutional  arrangements.  As  a  result 
professional  staff in the  Delegations  are  excessively  engaged  in administrative  tasks  rather  than 
dealing with substantive policy issues.  In  the case of the regional trade and tourism programmes, it 
was  found  that  the  vast  majority  of communication  between  Headquarters  and  the  Delegation 
concerned procedural aspects and that there was relatively little discussion of substantive policy or 
programming issues. 
Backstopping from Headquarters 
Delegations  rely  on  Headquarters,  mainly  to  'push the  decisions  through  the  system'  and  less  to 
provide expert policy advice. It appears that the relations between the Delegation and the different 
units in Headquarters are not systematic and rely on the relationships established between individuals 
involved.  In  some cases, Delegation advisers  have difficulties in  clearing financial  and procedural 
matters with Headquarters.  For example, a Delegation requested a rules of origin derogation for a 
consultant organising a trade  fair  in  the  United States.  Headquarters  initially. rejected this  request 
which  was  only  later  approved,  after considerably  delay,  following  the  intervention  of the  desk 
officer. 
C.  Institutional Framework for Aid Management 
In accordance with the Lome provisions for regional co-operation, ACP governments are allowed to 
mandate a regional organisation to represent them in matters concerning the regional aid programme 
financed from the EDF. The EC encourages governments to do so, as this simplifies the management 
of regional programmes. 
Role ofCARIFORUM 
In  the  case  of the  Caribbean,  the  ACP countries  originally  mandated  CARICOM  to  act  on  their 
behalf.  When Haiti and the  Dominican Republic,  both non-CARICOM members, joined the ACP 
group in  the  early  1990s, a new organisation CARIFORUM was established specifically to manage 
the EC regional programme.  In October 1992, Ministers of the fifteen Caribbean ACP states adopted 
rules of procedure which designated CARIFORUM as  "the mechanism established to coordinate the 
allocation and undertake the monitoring of  resources out of  the European Development Fund for the 
purpose of  financing regional projects in the Caribbean". 
The Secretariat of CAFJFORUM comprises a Secretary General (ex officio the Secretary General of 
CARICOM) and a Programming Unit (PU)  and is  funded  from the  CRIP.  The Secretary General 
responds to  the representatives of the member countries through annual Ministerial Meetings where 
most countries are represented by their Minister of Foreign Affairs.  The decisions in these meetings 
are  consensual.  The  PU  has  four  staff  members  and  receives  administrative  support  from  the 
CARICOM Secretariat.  Its role is to facilitated the preparation and implementation of the CRIP. 
The  Secretary  General  is  the  Regional  Authorising  Officer  (RAO)  and  signs  the  Financing 
Agreements on behalf of the ACP states in  the region. He may delegate certain responsibilities to a 
Deputy  Regional  Authorising  Officer  (DRAO),  a  government  or other organisations.  For most 
projects, the DRAO is  the local National Authorising Officer. However, there are some exceptions 
particularly in  the  case of programmes based in  Barbados.  Several large programmes also  have a 
Programme Management and Coordination Units (PMCUs). 
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Programming Arrangements 
In the programming of the CRIP for EDF 8 (see Chapter N), CARIFORUM prepared information for 
the representatives of the member countries, presented them with drafts, led the consultation process 
in the region and represented them in the negotiations with the EC. 
After the CRIP is signed the CARIFORUM Secretariat becomes responsible for the identification and 
programming of regional projects.  The process typically begins the preparation by the PU of sector 
discussion paper (usually with assistance of consultants) which is circulated and discussed at regional 
consultation meetings. For the non-traditional EDF sectors,  such as  environment and decentralised 
co-operation,  these  discussions  have  tended  to  wide-ranging  and  have  involved  civil  society 
organisations,  NGOs,  and  the  private  sector.  In  sectors,  such  as  tourism,  which  have  long  been 
supported by  the EC discussion has  tended to  be  more  narrowly based involving relevant regional 
organisations  and  ministry  representatives  from  the  member  countries.  The  outcome  of these 
consultations  is  the  presentation  by  the  PU  of a  fmal  report  and  draft  fmancing  proposal  for 
consideration by the CARIFORUM Ministers.  In the preparation of its substantive proposals the PU 
tends  to  rely  heavily  on  the  work  of consultants  and/or  on  proposals  submitted  by  regional 
organisations that are to participate in the programme. 
In practice CARIFORUM is  encouraged to involve the appointed DRAO, the associated Delegation, 
and the Delegation in Guyana in the preparation of programme and project documentation. Although 
CARIFORUM is responsible for the preparation of the project document and getting the approval of 
the  CARIFORUM  member  states,  the  DRAO  and  the  responsible  Delegation  must  appraise  the 
document and it is  the  Delegation which is  formally  responsible for preparing the draft Financing 
Proposal  and  for  communicating  with  Headquarters  in  the  elaboration  of the  fmal  text  of the 
Financing Proposal. After the Financing Proposal has been approved in Headquarters and a Financing 
Agreement signed, the responsibility for the implementation of programmes and projects devolves to 
the DRAOs and the appointed Delegations together with the implementing agencies. 
Arrangements for Programme and Project Implementation 
As soon as the project or programme has been approved it becomes the responsibility of the DRAO 
and the appointed Delegation to  oversee its management.  Implementation may involve of a number 
of regional institutions, each responsible for particular components of the project. For example, in the 
tourism  programme  there  are  four  implementing  agencies.  In order  to  coordinate  the  efforts  of 
different implementing agencies, Programme Management and Coordination Units  (PMCUs) have 
been introduced during the implementation of EDF 7 in some of the programmes, including tourism 
and agriculture and fisheries. They function is as an interface between the DRAO and implementing 
agency on one side and the Delegation/Headquarters on the other side. They have no decision-making 
power but  ensure  that  documents  that  go  from  one  side  to  the  other  are  in  the  right  form  and 
complete. Box 5 sets out some of the advantages and disadvantages of the system. 
PMCU  s are fmanced from project funds.  Staff are recruited from within the Region according to 
EDF rules and tendering procedures for T  A appointments. The EC participates in the selection of the 
local  managers  or  executive  directors.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of PMCUs,  the  recruitment  of 
management staff was  the  direct responsibility  of the DRAO  and  the  involvement' of the EC  was 
considerably  less.  The  establishment  of  PMCUs  has  caused  some  friction  and  delays  in  the 
implementation of the regional programmes and projects. 
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Box 5:  Advantages and Disadvantages of the PMCUs and the Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of the Implementation of Programmes 
Advantages  Disadvantages 
0  ·regional composition of the management  0  TOR for the PMCU need to be agreed 
team which may Increase the feeling of  between the DRAO, the appofnted 
ownership of the different countries.  Delegation and Headquarters. This can 
0  EC involvement may facilitate relations with 
sometimes involve a long process. 
programme managers and monitoring and  0  for recruitment of PMU staff  the firm that 
control function of the Delegation during the  sends the people has to be registered in the 
project.  DACONIFIBU system, which seems to 
0  the PMCU can fully concentrate on the 
disadvantage local flnns. 
implementation of the programme/project as  0  delays in the implementation process 
soon as it is in place and speed up decisions  caused by the tendering procedures in the 
and activities from then on.  setting up of PMCUs. 
0  PMCU has in principle no political links and  0  reduces feeling of ownership and 
could be more neutral to proposals than  responsibility of the DRAO. 
existing regional bodies may be. 
0  programme implementation depends on the 
existence of the PMU and its capabilities 
The regional bodies responsible for programme implementation can in some cases operate as parallel 
systems  with  limited  accountability  to  the  individual  countries  and  may  undermine  national 
structures. An example of this is the change in the trade development programme between EDF 6 and 
EDF 7.  Initially the programme was elaborated as a Caribbean Export Development Project which 
worked closely with the national trade promotion organisations and was for its trade policy work 
linked to CARICOM.  Under EDF 7 the responsibility for the programme was transferred to a new 
regional  organisation,  CEDA,  which  no  longer works  through  the  governmental  trade  promotion 
organisations but instead directly with business organisations. 
Assessment of the Institutional Framework 
CARIFORUM  is  essentially  an  organisation  created  by  the  EC  to  implement  its  regional  aid 
programme and is supported by EDF funds. Its links with its member governments are considered by 
some observers to be weak.  Consequently, the interest of the governments in CARIFORUM is rather 
limited, viewing it primarily as  a mechanism for managing the regional funds they receive from the 
EDF.  CARIFORUM has had an impact, though as  yet a somewhat limited one, at the political and 
policy level.  It has provided a platfonn for cooperation and stronger links between CARICOM and 
Haiti and the Dcmir.ic:rn Republic, as well as between the two latter countries. 
The  experience  with  CARIFORUM  as  a  structure  for  managing  the  implementation  of regional 
programmes has been mixed.  Although CARIFORUM has succeeded in increasing commitment rates 
by getting projects approved (with 83% of EDF 7 funds allocated by the end of 1996), there is some 
evidence that this  may have  been at  the  expense of adequate  involvement of those organisations 
responsible  for  the  subsequent implementation  phase.  Insufficient  ownership and inconsistencies 
between programme design and implementation have been identified as factors behind the delays that 
have  incurred in  the  implementation of several  programmes and the low disbursement rate of the 
CRIP under EDF 7 (8% of funds committed at the end of 1996).  The trade development programme 
is  a case where some implementation problems could have been avoided if the proposals had been 
reviewed by the Delegation responsible.  More generally some observers expressed concern about the 
transparency of consultation and programming procedures within CARIFORUM. 
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The  argument  for  a  less  centralised  approach  to  the  implementation  of regional  programmes  is 
reinforced  by  this  analysis.  Among  those  responsible  for  implementing the  regional  programmes 
there  is  a  widely  held  view  that  CARIFORUM  represents  additional  layer  of decision-making. 
Whereas  previously  implementing  agencies  directly  responded  to  the  appointed  Delegation  and 
responsible DRAO they are now partly dependent on action from the CARIFORUM Secretariat.  This 
suggests the need to distinguish between the role of CARIFORUM at the programme planning stage, 
and  the experience in  implementation which  has  often been overly centralised and  insufficiently 
responsive to local conditions. 
Finally, because CARIFORUM is considered as a semi-political forum, it is the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs  that  have  generally  represented  their countries  in  discussions  on  the  CRIP.  Because the 
NAOs and DRAOs are generally drawn from the Ministries of Finance or Planning, there is a danger 
that this could create a discontinuity in the programming discussions.  CARIFORUM is aware of this 
problem and has indicated it will invite DRAOs to those meetings at which the CRIP is discussed. 
D.  Project Identification, Planning and Appraisal 
The  CARIFORUM  evaluation  provides  a  good  description  of the  project  identification  process 
undertaken for  EDF 7. 
27  This typically involves  three  main  stages  involved:  (i) sector: studies and 
project  design  by  consultants;  (ii) technical  meetings  of  CARIFORUM  ministers;  and 
(iii) consultation  meetings,  involving  relevant  or  potential  implementing  agencies  before  a  draft 
fmancing  proposal  is  prepared.  The  PU,  which  was  established  under EDF 7,  has  considerable 
discretion  in  the  drafting  of project  proposals.  In  practice  it  relies  heavily  on  consultants  for 
undertaking background studies and the preparation of project documentation. 
In practice the process of project selection within CARIFORUM was  influenced by the desire of its 
members to see a sharing regional funds between countries.  Consequently, rather than focusing on 
strategic regional issues member countries have tended to come up with a list of projects which are 
primarily geared to national interests.  The EC has responded to this by stimulating policy dialogue at 
a sector level.  However, the entitlement basis of the EDF can place the EC in rather weak position in 
the subsequent project negotiations.  Where it requests changes and improvements to the financing 
proposal, this often involves long delays, which are then blamed on the EC. 
National  considerations  have  also  sometimes  led  to  programmes  becoming  too  ambitious  and 
complex,  involving  various  administrations,  implementing  agencies  and  different  country 
components.  The  inclusion  of the  Dominican  Republic  and  Haiti  within  CRIP  has  also  had  an 
influence on  such decisions.  Thus, the recent mid-term review of the trade programme noted that 
"the political expediency to  create a regional sub-office in  the Dominican Republic has resulted in 
an inefficient operational structure. "
28 
The  reliance  of the  PU  on  the  use  of consultants  in  the  design  and  preparation  of projects  and 
programmes also involves some risks.  In particular, there is the risk that consultants do not build up 
sufficient  insight  on  political  and  implementation  constraints  affecting  the  acceptability  of the 
programme or the management of it.
29  It appears that, prior to the establishment of the PU, this was 
less of a problem since implementing agencies had more input at the identification stage and a greater 
involvement in the management of consultants.  There is some evidence of insufficient involvement 
27 
28 
29 
Ramboll, October 1997, CARIFORUM Evaluation Study, p.25 
Geomar International, February 1998, Evaluation of the European Commission's Caribbean Regional Trade Sector 
Programme, draft report. 
An example is the proposal for the regional environment programme which was rejected by the EC because it was 
seen a., a way to top up the Global Environment Fund, as opposed to developing a separate intervention from EC 
aid. 
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of the adequacy of the inputs of the implementing agencies, member country government and the EC 
Delegations in the design and preparation of regional projects. 
The procedures involved in  identifying, preparing and  securing fmance  for a project often involve 
considerable delays.  In some cases this resulted in  proposals becoming outdated and having to be 
reworked, resulting in further delay. 
E.  Implementation of Regional Aid Programmes 
Analysis  of secondary  commitment  and  disbursement  indicators  shows  that regional  programmes 
have  faced  delays  in  implementation.  The  following  reasons  were  mentioned  by  ACP  and  EC 
officials to explain these delays: 
•  the complex institutional and operational structures arising out of the need to  involve he 
15 member countries in the management of the regional programme; 
•  overly  complex  programme  design  resulting  in  an  excessive  number  of component 
activities; 
•  insufficient  ownership  of  programmes  and  consequent  commitment  to  their  timely 
implementation at the level of national governments; 
•  the limited resources of PU and EC Delegations to monitor implementation; 
•  variations in  the capacities of Delegations to  follow up  in  implementation issues due to 
pressures of work and the priority being given to NIP implementation; and 
•  lengthy and bureaucratic tendering procedures for the recruitment of the PMCU. 
Procedures and Instructions for Implementation 
The  administrative and approval requirements in  getting funds committed and contracts organised 
and paid,  are  very  considerable.  Recently  some  changes  were  made to  the  decision  making and 
financing procedures. 
Tendering Procedures and Practice 
Tendering under the regional programmes mainly relates to the recruitment of PMCUs.  Subsequent 
implementation  has  been  done  mainly  on  a  direct  labour  or  work  programme  basis.  For  the 
recruitment for the PMCUs the restricted tendering procedure has been applied.  Even so, recruitment 
for the tourism programme the recruitment took 26 months to  appointment and another 7-8 months 
before the team started working in  November 1997. The human resources development programme 
had its contract for the PMCU signed in July 1997 after a tendering process that took 30 months. The 
agriculture  and  fisheries  programme  only  launched  its  PMCU  tender  in  September  1997.  The 
CARIFORUM Programming Unit was established by 'direct appointment' after a selection was made 
from short-lists provided by the different governments and only subject to approval of Headquarters. 
The  award  of  TA  and  consultancy  contracts  poses  two  particular  problems.  First,  tightened 
implementation controls mean that the duration of contracts is tending to be shortened from 3-5 years 
to 2 years.  However, for some programmes, for example tourism, this period may be insufficient to 
have achieved measurable results.  Second, although local consultants are able to tender for contracts, 
and the EC formally encourages them to do so, in practice they face considerable difficulties. 
Work Programmes 
Most programmes and projects under the  CRIP are relatively complex involving several elements, 
have various implementing agencies and involve implementation in  several different countries.  To 
allow for the necessary flexibility in the day-to-day planning and management and avoid some of the 
more  time-consuming  implementation  procedures,  these  programmes  have  increasingly  been 
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implemented under the  'work programme'  procedure:  This  operates  on  the  basis  of advances  and 
principle of sound accounting. 
Work programmes are described in the User's Guide to the Financial Procedures of  the EDF, as  'an 
alternative to  standard contracts for  implementing projects
130
.  The Guide states that the  'national 
administration of  an ACP country takes the responsibility for carrying out the works directly through 
its public works department and using its own staff and equipment'. 
31  It is described as an exception 
to the principle of competition, as  it  provides for a derogation from the  general principle of open 
tendering. It is  intended to  increase efficiency in executing the programme by allowing the project 
administration greater discretion in  applying the EDF rules with less involvement of Headquarters. 
Financial  management  is  based  on  a  work  programme  with  a  yearly  cost  estimate/budget,  both 
prepared by the Project Director.  The programme works on a reimbursement basis. Box 6 sets out the 
strengths and weaknesses of the system. 
Box 6  Strengths and Weaknesses of  the "Direct Labour,. Approach Applied to 
Regional Programmes 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
0  Increases speed and flexibilfty for the  0  General EDF rules still apply wruch can 
implementation of the programme {no DAGs  undermine some of the advantages. Initially 
or PMSs are required)  intended for public works within a country. 
some of the provisions, in particular related 
to the funding which must be in national 
currency, do not easily fJt with a regional, 
multi-country programme 
0  Transfers more responsibifity for the  0  Implementation by an (inter)govemmental 
Implementation to the local implementing  body. may lead to the creation or growth of a 
agency  bureaucracy that is based on aid financing 
and not sustainable fn its own right 
The work programme procedures appears to have been successfully applied in the region in order to 
facilitate  the  implementation  of complex  programmes  and  in  getting  around  some  of the  more 
cumbersome EDF procedures.  An  example  is  the  trade  development programme  implemented  by 
CEDA.  The Executive Director of CEDA acts as Project Director (also called the 'imprest holder'). 
He is appointed by the RAO and prepares the annual work programme and cost estimates.  After the 
approval  of the  financing  proposal,  he  is  responsible  for  providing the  information  necessary  to 
secure  the  initial  appropriation  fund.  He  is  then  responsible  for  operation  of the  fund  (making 
commitments, authorising payment) and for submitting payment orders and supporting documents to 
Headquarters in order to obtain replenishments. 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Most regional  programmes  have  their own  Executive Committee and/or  Board of Directors  with 
representatives  from  different  countries  in  the  region  and  different  interest  groups  (government, 
private sector, NGOs). The PU and EC Delegation are also members of these bodies. Together they 
take  care  of the  monitoring  of the  activities  in  the  field.  In  some  cases,  for  example  the CEDA 
programme, the  involvement of these committees in day-to-day  management has  caused problems 
where their role extended beyond guiding the progranune at a broader policy level. 
30 
31 
In tenns of the Lome Convention are referred to in the clause relating to the use of 'direct labour' (Art 299). 
p.  39 of User's Guide 
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On the EC side the Delegation in Guyana prepares the annual reports on the Regional Programme and 
gives  annual  updates  on  the  status  of different  projects  and  programmes.  In  Headquarters  staff 
monitor  programme  and  project  development  with  the  Project  Information  and  Control  System, 
which gives information about progress from the early identification phase onwards and the OLAS 
database which reports on financial advancements. 
Procedures for introducing design changes to a project during implementation tend to be protracted 
since they  require  the  formal  agreement of EC and  the CARIFORUM..  This can lead to  serious 
problems as occurred in  a tourism project in Grenada where the mid-term review called for changes 
to the project.  However, these could not be implemented because the government would not agree 
with them. 
Evaluations are undertaken before the second phase of a project or before a new programme is about 
to be identified. For projects and programmes under EDF 7 only a mid-term review of CEDA and an 
evaluation of CARIFORUM have so far been carried out. An evaluation of the tourism programme 
will  start  during  1998.  Implementation  of  other  components  of  the  CRIP  has  not  reached  a 
sufficiently  advanced  stage  to  justify  undertaking  mid-term  reviews  or  evaluations.  The 
CARIFORUM  evaluation  has  already  triggered  a  number  of significant  changes  including:  (i) 
involvement  of  the  NAOs  in  CARIFORUM  meetings  related  to  the  CRIP  programming  and 
implementation;  and  (ii)  a  requirement  to  consult  with  the  Delegations  in  the  region  in  the 
identification phase of programmes that will be implemented under their responsibility. 
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Annex A: List of People Interviewed 
Barbados - EC Delegation 
Mr G Gwyer - Delegate 
Mr M Dihm - Economist 
Mr E Voss - Agriculture Adviser 
Mr F Affinito - Economic Adviser 
Mr D Todd- Social Adviser 
Mr K Gofas - Engineer 
Ms R Miller - Associate Adviser 
Mr M Langemeyer - Associate Adviser 
Mr J Ferguson -Technical Assistant (Bananas) 
Barbados - British Development Division 
MrB Thomson 
Mr R Cunningham 
Mr K Livingstone 
Barbados - Other Aid Agencies 
Ms D Boyd - UNDP 
Ms M Gibson- CIDA 
Mr 1 C Espinosa - UNICEF 
Mr M Kamau - UNICEF 
Mr D Durant - CDB 
Barbados- Regional Bodies 
Mr D Clark- University of West Indies 
Mr Earle Baccus- Executive Director- CEDA 
Mr 1 L Liranzo - Programme Manager - CEDA 
Barbados - Private Sector 
Mr D Lavine- Pine Hill Dairy 
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Annex B: Discussion Note on Trade Integration in the Caribbean 
The concept of region in  the Caribbean is  an exercise in  variable geometry, given the number of economic and 
political agreements, including different and  often overlapping group of countries. This Annex focuses on the 
ACP  countries,  which  are  the  beneficiaries  of the  EU  Program  of Regional  Cooperation  under  the  Lome 
Convention. These include countries in  CARICOM, Haiti and the  Dominican Republic, all grouped under the 
institutional umbrella of the CARIFORUM Secretariat. 
One  of the  main  pillars  of the  EC's  regional  cooperation  strategy  is  to  foster  trade  integration  among  the 
CARIFORUM countries. In  order to  evaluate the strategy and the associated policy dialogue, it is necessary to 
review  the  underlying  economic  rationale  for  trade  integration  between  relatively  underdeveloped  small 
economies, and whether the evidence available on the Caribbean region is in line with that rationale. 
The Issue 
The strategy of trade promotion shared by all major donor agencies rests on the assumption that global free trade 
delivers maximum welfare. Taking this assumption for granted, the question is whether regional integration (Rl) 
is a step forward towards globalliberalisation. RI has indeed an ambiguous identity, as it creates at the same time 
free trade areas and more or less penetrable trade blocks. 
A wave of new regional programmes started in the mid 1980s, with the enlargement of the European Community 
to include Greece, Spain and Portugal; the United States free trade agreements with Israel, Canada and the later 
implementation of the NAFf  A; the reviving or creation of southern trade agreements like the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR)  between  the  Southern Latin  American  countries  and  the  Central  American  Common 
Market (CACM); and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
As  a  consequence,  a  debate  on  the  welfare  implications  of these  agreements  flourished.
32  The  discussion 
revolves around two basic arguments: (i) whether the implementation of a regional trade agreement increases or 
reduces  global  free  trade;  and  (ii)  whether  regional  agreements  are  intermediate  steps  toward  global 
liberalisation or towards a world divided in a number of tight regional blocks. There is, in addition, a critical set 
of related issues which might be loosely grouped into a social and cultural category, to which we return later. In 
that the general pressure is towards the elimination of trade protectionism, the starting point of any analysis must 
be an economic analysis of trade and its welfare effects. 
Do regional trade agreements increase global free trade? 
The answer to the question depends on whether the agreement creates or diverts trade. Consider three countries, 
A, B and C, and trade in one good, for example shoes. A and B form a trade agreement. If both A and B do not 
produce shoes and import them from C,  the agreement has no impact on the trade of shoes. If  also A produces 
shoes, but in  a less efficient way  than C,  the agreement may divert trade; B starts importing shoes from A and 
stops importing them from the more efficient C, as far as the region external tariff more than compensates for A's 
inefficiencies. Global production shifts from efficient to inefficient producers thereby reducing global welfare. If 
both A and B produce shoes and C does not, but B is more efficient than A, then, following the liberalisation of 
trade between A and B, all shoe production moves to B. In this case the agreement is trade creating, and induces 
a reallocation of resources towards the most efficient producer and increases global welfare. 
This example is  schematic and  does  not  take  into  account many  of the complexities of the  process of trade 
liberalisation, such as dynamic issues, strategic behaviour of the different countries, impact of trade flows on tax 
revenues,  and  so  on,  but  it  provides  a  useful  and  straightforward framework  to  look at  the  impact of trade 
agreements. 
The first case, that of a trade agreement between countries that do not trade and have no reason to start doing so 
represents the reality of many South-South agreements, especially in Africa,  where the share of intra-regional 
trade remains low and the overall trade share of the region declines. 
32  For an analysis of the different facets of the debate,  see de Melo JandA Panagariya (ed.),  New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1992, and Anderson K and R Balc.khurst, Regional Integration 
and the Global Trading System, Harvester and Wheatsheaf, 1993. 
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In  the  second case of trade  diversion,  there  are  many  examples of agreements,  especially South-South ones, 
where some trade takes place within the region, but mostly for products that are competitive only because of the 
existence of external trade barriers. These agreements basically implement an import substitution strategy at the 
regional level. 
The  third  case,  trade  creation,  reflects  the  case  of North-South  or  North-North  agreements.  North-South 
agreements,  like NAFf  A or the EU agreement with Eastern Europe, pull together countries with very different 
comparative advantages and factor endowments. Trade is  normally redistributed  on  the  basis of comparative 
advantage.  Southern nations  benefit as  they  can specialise  in  labour intensive  activities  and  they  gain  cheap 
access to  capital intensive Northern products. North-North agreements  foster intra-industry trade based on  the 
exploitation  of economies  of scales  and  product  differentiation.  Intra-industry  trade  generally  takes  place 
between advanced economies. 
The 'quality' of the agreement shows in three sets of performance indicators reflecting sustainability (how long it 
lasts  and  whether it  is  effectively implemented), relevance (the  share of intra-regional trade on  global trade), 
impact on global trade (share of the region in  global trade). According to  this classification, only North-North 
and North-South agreements have performed satisfactorily. Very few South-South agreements have lasted over 
time  or  have  been  fully  implemented,  have  a  share of intra-regional  trade  larger  than  4  per cent and  have 
increased their share in  total world trade. This outcome is surprising if we  consider regions like the EU where 
roughly 60 per cent of trade is  intra-regional and which has moved from 24 per cent of world trade in  1960 to 
41.4 per cent in  1990.
33 
Are regional agreements intermediate steps toward globalliberalisation of  trade? 
This question has to do with the relative difficulty of bringing about global agreements like the Uruguay Round 
in a world where (i) the number of players and the incentive to free ride have increased substantially; (ii) the key 
player (the  US)  has  partly lost its  prominent role; and  (iii)  new trade practices, like  antidumping actions and 
voluntary trade restrictions, have come into play. If regional groups instead of countries enter into global trade 
negotiations, these are expected to become much simpler. 
It is,  however,  not clear whether regional blocs are more or less prone to free  trade than individual countries. 
Rather, if the 'our large market is large enough' thinking prevails, the free trade outcome is less likely to become 
an  optimal strategy. The whole issue boils down to  the nature of the  decision making processes in the regions. 
Indeed, the final outcome will depend on the preferences of the key players: policy makers and interest groups of 
the region and outside countries.
34 
The Caribbean Region 
Is  the  structure  developed  above  of any  help  in  analysing  the  Caribbean  region?  Let  us  start  with  some 
institutional background. CARICOM was created in  1973 to achieve a single market, but the lowering of trade 
barriers  has  been  an  extremely  painful  and  slow  process,  not  yet  accomplished  at  the  time  of writing.  The 
common external tariff (CET) was due to  be implemented in  1981, in  theory turning CARl  COM into a Custom 
Union. However, the CET was not implemented, and countries continued to preserve the ri?ht to levy additional 
surcharges on sensitive products, as  the CARICOM treaty lists  123  separate activities exempted from any CET 
restriction. Moreover, a large share of non-CARICOM products was subject to import licenses. 
In  1992, the trade policy stance changed substantially. The CET was to be compressed from 0-45 per cent to a 5-
20  per cent by  the  end  of 1998. Temporary surcharges  were  to  replace most quantitative restrictions and all 
minimum  pricing  requirements  were  to  be  eliminated.  Consumption  and  stamp  taxes  were  gradually  to  be 
replaced by the VAT, consequently eliminating cascading effects. At the time of writing this process is  not yet 
accomplished.  The  CET  is  well  above  20  per  cent  for  many  imported  products.  Licensing  and  temporary 
surcharges are still effective and VAT has not yet replaced consumption and stamp taxes. 
Does CARl  COM fulfil the three quality requirements for a regional trade agreement? Firs~ sustainability: if  we 
have to judge from the number of years CARICOM has been in place, the answer is yes- 25  years of existence 
33  de Melo JandA Panagarya, 1ntroduction', in de Melo and  Panagariya (ed.), op cit. 
Bhagwati J, 'Regulation and Multilateralism: An Overview', in de Melo and  Panagariya (ed.), op cit. 
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are  certainly  a  sign  of endurance.  However,  if we  judge from  the  pace  of implementation,  the  outcome  is 
disappointing.  The  CET  is  only  theoretical:  free  circulation  of goods  is  negatively  affected  by  licensing 
requirements  and  differences  in  the  system  of indirect  taxation.  In  the  taxonomy  of regional  agreements 
CARlCOM should effectively be  classified as  a Preferential Trade Area (the frrst step on the  road of regional 
liberalisation), rather than as a Customs Union.
35 
Second, relevance: Table Bl gives us  the directions of trade for the CARlCOM countries between  1991  and 
1995. If  we look at 1995 we  see that the share of regional exports is almost 8 per cent and of regional imports 
almost 10 per cent. In this respect. CARICOM performs better than other South-South trade areas in Central and 
South America. The average share of intra-regional exports between  1985  and  1990 was 4.6 per cent for the 
Andean Pact,  14.8 per cent for the CACM and  10.6 per cent for the LAIA.
36  Further, the share of intra-regional 
exports has increased in  the  1990s, from  12  per cent in  1991  to  almost 18  per cent in  1995. However, if we 
exclude exports of petroleum from Trinidad and Tobago, the increase in the share is less substantial, from 12 per 
cent to 13.5 per cent. 
Table 81:  CARICOM: Direction of  Trade, 1993-95  (EC$ million) 
1991  1994  1993  1994  1995 
Value  %  Value  %  Value  %  Value  %  Value  % 
Exports 
CARlCOM (1)  1  '185.4  12.1%  1,217.2  12.8%  1,406.1  16.1%  1,699.6  15.7%  2,225.9  17.9% 
Other Caribbean  845.0  8.6%  954.0  10.0%  737.2  8.4%  681.4  6.3%  875.9  7.0% 
NAFTA (2)  4,166.3  42.6%  4,136.4  43.4%  3,957.8  45.2%  5,012.6  46.3%  5,178.8  41.7% 
EU  1,982.1  20.3%  1,604.8  16.8%  1.476.5  16.9%  1,742.2  16.1%  2,434.9  19.6% 
Others  1,605.2  16.4%  1,623.4  17.0%  1,173.4  13.4%  1,688.8  15.6%  1,716.4  13.8% 
Total  9,784.1  100.0%  9,535.8  100.0%  8,751.0  100.0%  10,824,.6  100.0%  12,431.8  100.0% 
Imports 
CARl  COM  1,129.4  8.4%  1,071.0  8.6%  1,357.4  9.0%  1,571.6  10.2%  1,n9.8  9.9% 
Other Caribbean  516.8  3.8%  397.0  3.2%  475.9  3.2%  450.0  2.9%  429.0  2.4% 
NAFTA  6,228.4  46.3%  6,104.7  49.1%  7,480.5  49 .. 7%  8,169.8  53.1%  9,299.4  51.6% 
EU  2, 140,.3  15.9%  1,771.3  14.3%  2,145.9  14.3%  1,997.3  13.0%  2,597.3  14.4% 
Others  3,441.3  25.6%  3,078.9  24.8%  3,584.5  23.8%  3,193.4  20.8%  3,916.2  21.7% 
Total  13,456,.2  100.0%  12,422.8  100.0%  15,044.1  100.0%  15,382.2  100.0%  18,021.8  100.0% 
Notes: 
(1) Differences in intra regional imports and exports are du to differences in cit and fob prices 
(2) Excluding Mexico in 1991  and 1992 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 
Third,  impact on  global  trade:  the  relative  large  share of intra-regional  trade  and  the  substantial differences 
between many of the region's economies implies that there is some scope for trade within the region. However, if 
we consider the type of products traded and the barriers to extra-regional imports, it appears that most of intra-
regional trade is made of import substitution products where the region does not necessarily have a comparative 
advantage. 
Consider Tables B2 and B3, which rank the major products exported inside and outside the region respectively 
according to  their export share in  1996. We notice that the structure of exports differs substantially in the two 
cases. Exports outside the region are resource based: natural or processed food products like sugar, bananas, rum 
and  see-food;  raw  minerals  or  their  derivatives  like  petroleum,  bauxite,  iron  and  steel,  inorganic  chemical 
JS 
36 
A Preferential Trade Agreement implies lower tariffs on imports from the partners than from the rest of the world; 
a Free Trade  Area,  involves  zero  tariffs  on  trade  among  partner countries  but  positive tariffs  on imports from 
outside countries; a Customs Union is like a Free Trade Area, but with a common external tariff; a Single Market 
is like a Customs Union but also involves free circulation of persons, capitals and finns. 
de Melo and Panagarya, 'Introduction', op cit. Figures are average for the 1985-90 periods 
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elements. Apparel and clothing is  the  only non-resource based product which has an export share larger than  1 
per cent.  In contrast,  major exports  in  the  region  are  made  of manufacturing  products that,  except for  some 
products included in 'Miscellaneous edible products and preparations' and Iron and Steel, are not resource based. 
We have no evidence of whether Caribbean countries are efficient producers of the  goods traded in  the  area. 
However, all  those products benefit from  very high rates of protection, still in  place at the time of writing.  In 
general terms, if we consider a country like Barbados the average unweighted nominal tariff for 2,400 categories 
was 22 per cent in 1990. If  stamp duties and consumption taxes are included, the average nominal rate rises to 41 
per cent.
37  More specifically,  let  us  consider some of the  best performing products.  For pasta,  uncooked or 
unprepared (which is part of Miscellaneous Food) custom duties and surtaxes range from 35 per cent to  100 per 
cent; for biscuits, from  20 per cent to  106 per cent; for aerated beverages from 25  per cent to 35 per cent; for 
paints from 25  per cent to  100 per cent. 
38  The level of protection granted by such tariffs is  high if we  consider 
that on the eve of the Uruguay Round in  1987 the average tariff for the United States was 4.9 per cent and for the 
European Community 6 per cent. 
37 
38 
Table 82:  CARICOM~  composition of Intra-regional exports by major products 
1991-96  (EC$ million) 
1991  1996 
Value  %  Value 
Paper and Paperboard  65.3  7.4%  110.1 
Miscellaneous edible products and preparations  51.5  5.9%  89.7 
Aerated beverages  26.2  3.0%  83.3 
Manufactures of metal  48.5  5.5%  68.2 
Organic surface active agents  35.5  4.0%  65.1 
Iron and steel  45.6  5.2%  60.5 
Cement  29.3  3.3%  52.6 
Household and toilet soap  34.6  3.9%  48.6 
Pastry biscuits and cakes  22.7  2.6%  45.4 
Pigments, paints and varnishes  26.8  3.1%  39.3 
Apparel and clothing  26.2  3.0%  30.7 
Plastic packing material  11.5  1.3%  27.2 
Perfumery and cosmetics  32.7  3.7%  25.0 
Urea  11.1  1.3%  22.2 
Disinfectants  27.1  3.1%  22.2 
Other  385.9  43.8%  509.1 
Total intra-regional exports (1)  880.5  100.0%  1,299.1 
Notes:  (~) excluding petroleum and other crude minerals and re-exports 
IMF, Barbados: Recent Economic Developments, Staff Country Report Nr 95/32, 1995. 
CEDA. Caribbean Trade Information System (CARTIS), Trade Regulation Database 
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Table 83:  CARICOM: composition of extra-regional exports by major products 
1991-96  (C$ million) 
1991  1996 
Value  %  Value  % 
Inorganic chemical elements  495.4  10.5%  833,307  12.95% 
Apparel and Clothing  324.7  6.9%  731.9  11.4% 
Sugar  417.2  8.8%  585.1  9.1 
Iron and Steel  305.3  6.5%  514.0  8.0% 
Methyl alcohol  165.5  3.5%  331.2  5.2% 
Urea  169.8  3.6%  286.1  4.4% 
Bananas  479.4  10.1%  277.4  4.3% 
Miscellaneous edible products and preparations  20.6  0.4%  91.8  1.4% 
Rum  73.2  1.6%  133.5  2.11 
Coffee  33.7  0.7%  87.7  1.4 
Crustaceans and Molluscs  17.5  0.4%  78.3  1.2% 
Orange Juice  0.3  0.0%  64.3  1.0% 
Other  2,227.1  47.1%  2,421.7  37.6% 
Total extra-regional exports (  1)  4,729.7  100.0%  6,436.  100.0% 
Notes:  {1) excluding petroleum and other crude  minerals 
Moreover, many non competing importS  used  as  inputs for manufacturing products were exempt from custom 
duties, implicitly raising the  level of effective protection of import substitution products and creating a strong 
anti-export bias. Tax concessions for imported inputs for  export oriented firms  were only introduced in  1993. 
The anti-export bias was very substantial up  to the early 1990s. The effective rate of protection in Barbados in 
1991  was estimated to  be  between 53  per cent to  305  per cent for import substitution products and  between 
minus 30 per cent and minus 42 per cent for export oriented products.
39 
In  conclusion, following  the  classification of regional agreements developed above CARICOM appears to  fit 
well  in the  second group.  Indeed, there  is  some  evidence that the  agreement has  supported inefficient import 
substitution and  trade diversion rather than  trade creation.
40  In  this  respect, the  share of CARICOM in  world 
trade has declined from 0.2 per cent in  1980 to 0.08 per cent in  1993. The decline in oil prices account for part 
of this effect.  All  the  same,  the  market share of the  region  excluding Trinidad and  Tobago,  which  is  the  oil 
exporter, falls from 0.07 per cent to 0.045 per cent over the period.
41 
It is now useful to turn to the other issue raised at the start of this Annex: whether CAR!  COM can be considered 
a positive step  towards overall trade liberalisation. The slow pace of implementation of liberal  trade policies 
does  not  reflect  a  clear  commitment  of liberalisation.  The  combination  of reliance  and  inefficiency  that 
characterise Caribbean intra-regional  trade  is  also  risky  as  policy makers  will  probably be reluctant to  adopt 
liberal  policy  measures  across  the  board.  A  counterbalancing  effect,  though,  may  result  from  the  external 
environment. Indeed, if we  look back at Table B 1 we see that CAR!  COM's trade is dominated by NAFf  A, the 
largest  trading  partner,  with  a  share  of 41  per  cent  on  export and  51  per cent  on  imports.  In  this  respect, 
Caribbean  countries  face  a  fundamental  challenge. If they  enter  into  NAFf  A  many  of their  manufacturing 
activities risk being threatened by more efficient producers.  However,- the-cost of staying out of NAFf  A is also 
high. 
39 
41 
IMF, op cit., reported from Maxwell Stamp, Export Competitiveness and Market Study in Barbados. 
A  more  detailed  analysis  would  need  to  refer  to  non-traditional  gains  from  regional  integration  and  trade  in 
services. 
UNCf  AD, Handbook of International Trade, 1994 
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